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Abstract
Internet display advertising industry follows two main business models. One model is based on
direct deals between publishers and advertisers where they sign legal contracts containing terms
of fulfillment for a future inventory. The second model is a spot market based on auctioning page
views in real-time on advertising exchange (AdX) platforms such as DoubleClick’s Ad Exchange,
RightMedia, or AppNexus. These exchanges play the role of intermediaries who sell items (e.g.
page-views) on behalf of a seller (e.g. a publisher) to buyers (e.g., advertisers) on the opposite
side of the market. The computational and economics issues arising in this second model have
been extensively investigated in recent times.
In this work, we consider a third emerging model called reservation exchange market. A reser-
vation exchange is a two-sided market between buyer orders for blocks of advertisers’ impressions
and seller orders for blocks of publishers’ page views. The goal is to match seller orders to buyer
orders while providing the right incentives to both sides. In this work we first describe the im-
portant features of mechanisms for efficient reservation exchange markets. We then address the
algorithmic problems of designing revenue sharing schemes to provide a fair division between
sellers of the revenue collected from buyers.
A major conceptual contribution of this work is in showing that even though both clinching
ascending auctions and VCG mechanisms achieve the same outcome from a buyer perspective,
however, from the perspective of revenue sharing among sellers, clinching ascending auctions are
much more informative than VCG auctions.
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Keywords and phrases Reservation Markets, Internet Advertising, Two-sided Markets, Clinching
Auction, Envy-free allocations.
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1 Introduction
The universe of internet advertisement is divided in two big worlds: search ads and display
ads. At first glance, they look very similar: both sell impressions using variants of the second
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price auction with reserves. A closer look, however, reveals that they are very different:
in search ads, the platform (Google or Bing, for example) is both the auctioneer and the
seller, i.e., it sells inventory in their own properties. This makes it a one-sided market design
problem, or in other words, the designer needs to reason only about the incentives of the
buyers. In display ads, the platform is auctioning inventory not owned by them, turning it
into a two-sided market design problem, where incentives for buyers (advertisers) and sellers
(publishers, such as websites, blogs and news portals) need to be balanced.
Designing practical markets for display ads is challenging, since the theory of market
design is much more developed for one-sided markets (there are tools like VCG, Myerson’s
optimal auction, . . . ) while for two-sided markets, what classic auction theory offers are
mainly impossibility results, such as the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem [23].
One complicating factor in display ads is that while we are used to think of internet
advertisement in the form of auctions, auctions are only the tip of the iceberg. The most
premium inventory is sold via the reservations market (also called direct deals or guaranteed
contracts.) In this method, a publisher and an advertiser make a deal to allocate a certain
number of impressions over a certain period, for a pre-specified price per impression. This
deal is made oﬄine in advance for a future inventory. Direct deals are known to suffer from
inefficiencies for two reasons: first is the manual nature of formation of these contracts which
allows a publisher to sign deals with a small number of advertisers, thus creating allocation
inefficiencies. The second reason is the manual negotiation between buyers and publishers
which incurs a huge cost and lowers the overall efficiency.
Auctions are fully automated and don’t suffer from any of these inefficiencies. On the
other hand, they can’t guarantee to buyers and sellers the certainty that reservations can. For
example, a brand launching a large campaign to advertise a new product certainly benefits
from the certainty (both in terms of cost and volume of impressions) provided by reservation
contracts.
The idea of automated reservation market is to overcome the shortcomings of both auctions
(real-time spot market) and traditional reservations (oﬄine negotiation). Such markets would
allow sellers and buyers to transact for a bulk inventory in advance. This is inspired by
a number of recent two-sided markets for online advertising, e.g., an exchange for future
contracts1. In particular, we study a two-sided market, which we call a reservation market,
where publishers can post offers for blocks of ad slots characterized by parameters like supply
level, reserve price, and their preference for a set of advertisers. Advertisers post requests for
ad slots defined by parameters like valuation, demand, and targeting constraints specifying
where and when they want to show their ads. The role of the reservation mechanism is to
match the seller and buyer orders that attain some economic objectives.
Note that, unlike ad exchange markets that offer impressions available on the spot, the
reservation market offers guaranteed deals for an inventory available in the future. Moreover,
the reservation market brings together multiple publishers and advertisers with the goal of
reducing the intermediation costs and the underlying inefficiencies of one-to-one deals, also
by selling bundles of inventories from different publishers.
In this work, we start the investigation of the economics and algorithmic principles that
are central to these reservation markets. The major questions we address in this work are:
What features and incentive properties form the basis of a successful reservation market?
What are the economic objectives of a reservation market? What are the revenue sharing
policies that we can employ? What are the algorithmic problems we need to address in the
design of reservation mechanisms?
1 http://www.massexchange.com/
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1.1 Our contribution
Our main contribution is to propose a formal model of reservation exchange market and
discuss what are desirable properties (referred to as axioms) for this market. Secondly,
we propose two specific mechanisms that help us understand the extent to which some of
the aforementioned properties can be simultaneously achieved. We also provide several
algorithmic results for the two mechanisms that we study.
Axioms for a reservation exchange market. In Section 2, we provide a simple and clean
abstraction of reservation exchange markets for display ads as a two-sided matching market
with buyer orders on one side and seller orders on the other side and in Section 3 we identify
a list of axioms that we wish any mechanism for these markets to approximately satisfy.
The first axiom for the reservation mechanism that we discuss is the efficiency of the
market, i.e., the social welfare of all agents of the market. The agents of the market are
sellers and buyers, both with quasi-linear utilities. Buyers aim at maximizing their utility,
i.e., the total value of the inventory received minus price. Sellers aim at maximizing revenue
minus reservation price. The mechanism decides on the allocation to buyer orders of the
inventory supplied from each seller, a payment to be charged to each buyer and a distribution
of the revenue among sellers.
Individual rationality (IR) requires that participating in the mechanism is beneficial to
all agents. Incentive compatibility (IC) requires that truthfully reporting one’s preferences to
the mechanism is the best strategy for each agent, independently from what the other agents
report.
Budget Balance (BB) states the payments of the advertisers must entirely and exclusively
be transferred to the publishers, i.e., the buyers and the sellers are allowed to trade without
leaving to the mechanism any share of the payments, and without the mechanism adding
money into the market. This axiom might appear strange at first glance, but it reflects a
business practice common to most exchanges, which is of the exchange to get a fixed cut
(typically called revenue sharing margin) of the seller’s revenue. The reasoning behind this
rule is that sellers have the option to send their inventory to different exchanges and keeping
the revenue sharing margin fixed helps the exchange to be perceived as fair and hence attract
more seller’s inventory. Since fixed margins are an industrial standard in the ads world,
any practical mechanism must implement some of that. Fixed margins are equivalent to
budget-balance applied to bids rescaled by the revenue sharing margin up to rescaling bids.
An ideal goal in a reservation exchange is to design IR, IC, BB mechanisms that maximize
the social welfare of all agents in the market. Unfortunately, Myerson and Satterthwaite
[23] proved impossibility for an IR, IC, and BB mechanism that maximizes social welfare in
such a market. The direction we pursue in this work is to ensure full efficiency and incentive
compatibility for buyers as the most desirable goal for advertiser. This can be achieved for
one-side markets by the family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [6, 29]. As
extensively discussed in this work, the main problem with the vanilla VCG allocation is that
it does not offer any good incentives to sellers, e.g., VCG can match fungible inventories
from different sellers to buyers that offer very different payments thus producing the feeling
that revenue is unfairly distributed among sellers.
An alternative to enforcing incentive compatibility for sellers is to design a mechanism
that leads to a fair distribution of mechanism’s revenue among sellers. Envy-free allocations
[28] and other notions of market equilibria have often been considered in markets that cannot
achieve full efficiency with truthful allocations. This leads to our third axiom as follows:
sellers should not envy each other with respect to the revenue that is received from the
mechanism.
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Most of the first part of the paper will be devoted to the discussion of which definition of
envy-freeness among sellers is meaningful for reservation exchange markets. Our conclusion
is that such a definition should crucially rely on the buyer-seller transactions that can arise
in an efficient allocation, while it should disregard revenue that can only be obtained from
allocations with suboptimal social welfare. With this aim, when introducing our notion
of envy-freeness between sellers, we define the concept of clinching graph as the collection
of buyer-seller transactions that can arise in a VCG allocation. We conveniently define
and compute the clinching graph by resorting to the implementation of VCG through an
ascending clinching auction.
A major insight of this paper is that while the usual description of VCG payments as
externalities imposed by agents on others offers little clue on how to split the proceeds of
the auction among the sellers, the alternative description of VCG as an ascending auction
(Ausubel’s clinching framework [1]) provides additional structure obtained from the execution
of the auction that can be exploited to design revenue sharing schemes. The clinching auction
returns not only bundle prices, but the order in which each item was sold and the price at
which the sale occurred. In an ideal case, whenever a clinch happens, if the clinching auction
points to a unique item to be clinched, then there is a unique way to split the revenue among
the sellers (and in this case clinching auctions capture the full information in how to split
the revenue). However, sometimes, when a clinch happens, there are multiple items that can
be used for that clinch. This is precisely the case when the clinching auction, even though it
provides more information than VCG, it doesn’t lead to a unique revenue sharing scheme,
and we rely on a notion of envy-freeness for the revenue sharing scheme.
Finally, we discuss further desirable properties of reservation markets as additional axioms,
and study our proposed mechanisms for their satisfaction of these axioms. These axioms
are stability properties that prevent the market to be manipulated from buyers or sellers.
We define the concept of buyer monotonicity (BM) as the property that the revenue of all
sellers does not decrease when new buyer orders are presented. A second property called
seller monotonicity (SM) states that the increase of the reservation price of a seller is not
responsible of the decrease of the revenue of another seller.
Algorithmic results. We restrict our attention to buyer incentive-compatible efficient mech-
anisms based on VCG allocations. For all these mechanisms truth-telling is a dominant
strategy for buyers. The major issue we face is to complement the VCG mechanism with
a suitable envy-free revenue sharing scheme between sellers. Our first result is actually a
negative result:
There exists no efficient revenue sharing scheme that is both envy-free and budget balance.
We actually demonstrate that any envy-free revenue sharing scheme cannot distribute
more than a
√
3− 1 + δ share of the total revenue, for any δ > 0.
Given the impossibility result above, we investigate the possibility of finding good trade-
offs between budget balance or envy freeness. Relaxing one of these two constraints imply
that either the mechanism is able to distribute a guaranteed share of the total revenue or
that any seller has only limited envy of any other seller. With this goal in mind, we propose
two revenue sharing schemes: (i) a revenue sharing by the clinching auction (CA), and (ii) a
revenue sharing by the eating mechanism (EM).
For the CA revenue sharing scheme, we prove the following desirable properties:
CA is budget balance.
CA is 1/2-envy free and this bound is tight.
CA is budget monotone and seller monotone.
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Finally, for the EM revenue sharing scheme, we prove that following three results:
EM is envy-free.
EM is at most 11+12+ budget balance, for any  > 0.
EM is at least e−1e -budget balance.
Most of the technical proofs are given in the full version of the paper.
1.2 Related work
Double Auctions. Double auctions are special cases of two-sided markets with unit-supply
buyers and sellers. Myerson and Satterthwaite [23] proved that it is impossible to obtain an
IR, Bayesian IC2, and weak BB 3 mechanism to maximize social welfare in double auctions.
Since then, much of the literature has focused on trading off social welfare for buyers and
sellers, incentive compatibility and budget balance for double auctions [21, 25, 26, 11, 7].
The seminal work on double auctions [21] shows that efficiency for both buyers and sellers
can actually be achieved asymptotically in large markets. In the context of one-shot auctions,
optimal auctions for two-sided settings has been studied by [23], following the Nobel-prize
winning work of [22]. The problem of finding the right trade-offs between social welfare, IC
and BB is largely open for two-sided markets that model reservation exchanges. In this work
we investigate two-sided markets that achieve IC for buyers and envy-freeness for sellers.
This follows a line of work that looks at envy-freeness and other market equilibria if social
welfare cannot be optimized truthfully [14, 19, 28]. Recently, this literature has also been
adopted to design the optimal revenue sharing double auctions in the context of advertising
exchanges [18]. In this paper, we focus on two-sided markets where multiple buyers are
allocated to multiple sellers and the allocation and pricing are done differently. Other than
online advertising systems, optimal two-sided markets can be applied to online and oﬄine
retailers and e-commerce websites like Amazon and eBay. A very recent paper by [20]
studies EBay’s double auction problem, but their setting is different from this paper as they
consider one buyer and multiple sellers, and explore approximately optimal pricing schemes
for this setting.
Clinching Ascending Auctions. One fundamental component of this work is the use of
the structure that can be obtained from the execution of Ausubel’s clinching auction [1]
in designing revenue sharing schemes for the sellers. The clinching auction has been very
successful in a variety of scenarios: designing auctions with budget constraints [10, 13, 8, 16],
designing online auctions [17], extracting revenue in settings with budgets [3, 9]. The current
paper adds to this line of work by showcasing another application of the clinching framework.
Cooperative games. Cooperative game theory may provide insights for modeling the fair
sharing of revenue in the ad reservation exchange market. Shapley value [27] is a widely
adopted notion of fair division between agents of the value of a game. It is however hard
to extend this concept to our model since a crucial axiom of Shapley value (summability)
does not hold in our case. Similar difficulties can also be found while trying to design a
revenue sharing scheme that results in an attribution that lies in the core of a game [15]. On
the positive side, we mention that the revenue sharing scheme by the clinching auction we
2 Bayesian incentive compatibility is a less restrictive form of incentive compatibility.
3 Weak budget balance allows the mechanism to retain a share of the payments while not subsidizing the
market.
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present resembles Shapley values since it is defined as the expected revenue obtained over all
possible seller permutations.
Market Equilibria. Several notions of equilibrium in markets have been studied. In a
Walrasian equilibrium, we have item prices such that every agent receives a bundle of items
that maximizes her utility, the market clears, and the corresponding outcome is efficient.
However, except from very special cases (e.g. unit demand buyers), it can’t be converted to
a mechanism that is incentive-compatible for the buyer [19, 12]. Envy-freeness for buyers is
also a concept widely used to characterize the stability of allocations. We do not survey here
the extensive literature on this topic. However, we notice that we instead adopt the notion
of envy-freeness to characterize fair revenue sharing schemes between sellers.
Reservation-based Internet advertising has also previously considered with more optimization-
related questions than mechanism design questions. Examples of this line of work that is
quite unrelated to the scope of this paper can be found in [30, 4, 24]. Markets that combine
characteristics of the spot market and of direct deals between publishers and sellers have
been also considered in [5] with the goal of maximizing the revenue of one single publisher.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a two-sided market, referred to as a reservation exchange market, consisting
of a set B of buyers and a set S of sellers. Each seller si ∈ S holds a supply of `i units of
an indivisible good and has a reserve price ρi for each unit of those goods. Each buyer is
interested in purchasing at most di units and has a value vi per unit. The structure of the
matching market is captured by a bipartite graph G = (B ∪ S, F ) which indicates which
buyer is interested in buying goods from which seller.
For example, in the case of internet advertisement, each buyer bj ∈ B corresponds to an
advertiser and a seller si ∈ S corresponds to a publisher. An edge (bj , si) ∈ F indicates that
buyer bj is interested in purchasing inventory from the publisher si’s website. We define
Bi = {bj ∈ B; (bj , si) ∈ F} as the set of buyers who target seller si inventory. Similarly, we
define Sj = {si ∈ S; (bj , si) ∈ F} as the set of sellers that are targeted by buyer bj .
We are interested in designing reservation exchange mechanisms (or simply reservation
mechanisms) which associate for any given matching market described by (B,S, v, d, `, ρ) an
outcome composed of:
an allocation xi[j] ∈ Z, indicating how many goods from seller si are sold to buyer bj ,
respecting demands aj :=
∑
i xi[j] ≤ dj and supply ci :=
∑
j xi[j] ≤ `i.
a total amount Pj paid by each buyer bj , such that the payment per unit doesn’t exceed
buyer j’s value per unit: Pj ≤ aj · vj
a revenue sharing scheme which allocates for each buyer bj and seller si, a portion Ri[j]
of the buyer’s payment Pj to seller si, such that
∑
iRi[j] ≤ Pj . We define Ri :=
∑
j Ri[j]
to be the total revenue obtained by seller i.
An outcome satisfying the properties above is said to be a feasible outcome. Given a
feasible outcome, the utility of involved agents are as follows:
buyers have quasi-linear utilities, i.e, uj = vj · aj − Pj .
sellers have the revenue minus the reservation price Ri − ρi · ci as their utility.
In the next section, we discuss a set of desirable properties for a reservation mechanism
and discuss which subsets of those properties can be simultaneously satisfied.
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3 Axioms for Reservation Exchange Markets
In this section, we develop an axiomatic approach to reservation markets. First, we define a
set of desirable properties, referred to axioms, for a well-designed market. As it is the case
with axiomatic approaches, some seemingly innocuous axioms might generate impossibility
results and some seemingly powerful axioms might not prevent the pitfalls we intended. Here,
we define a family of axioms (many with different variations) and discuss, using examples,
their strengths and weaknesses.
3.1 Fundamental Axioms: efficiency and budget-balance
We establish as our first and most important goal the maximization of market efficiency,
which is the sum of the utilities of all agents involved:
Efficiency [Eff]: The implemented outcome maximizes SW (B ∪ S) = ∑j∈B vj · aj +∑
i∈S ρi · (`i − ci) among all feasible outcomes, assuming the seller derives utility ρi for
unsold items.
In order to simplify notation, for each seller that has a reserve price ρi > 0 we add a
proxy buyer j(i) with demand dj(i) = `i and value vj(i) = ρi. Let also j(i) be the endpoint
of a single edge connecting it to seller i. Notice that there is a social-welfare-preserving
one-to-one map between outcomes for sellers with reserve prices and sellers without reserves
but with proxy buyers. This reduction allows us to ignore from this point on the reserve
prices ρi and focus on maximizing
∑
i vj · aj as the [Eff] goal.
A second goal of the mechanism is to distribute the revenue between sellers. A budget
balance mechanism should distribute the entire revenue collected from the buyers to the
sellers. A β-budget balance mechanism should distribute at least a β-fraction of the revenue.
β-Budget Balance [β-BB]: The implemented outcome is β-budget balance for a constant
β ∈ [0, 1] if ∑i∈S Ri ≥ β∑j∈B Pj . We say that the reservation mechanism is exact
budget balance if β = 1.
3.2 Stability properties
A second set of properties describes the stability of the allocation and resilience to manipula-
tion via adding or removing buyers or sellers:
Buyer Monotonicity [BM]: If a new buyer order bj is added, the revenue of all sellers in
Sj does not decrease.
Seller monotonicity [SM]: If a seller increases his reserve price, the revenue of all other
sellers does not decrease.
3.3 Incentive compatibility
We next define a set of desirable incentives properties for buyers and sellers.
[B-IC] Buyer incentive compatibility: Buyers maximize their utility by reporting their
true valuations to the mechanism.
[S-IC] Seller incentive compatibility: Sellers maximize their utility by declaring true
reserve prices and supply levels.
Unfortunately, [B-IC] and [S-IC] cannot be simultaneously achieved in a two-sided
market [23, 21] if not at the expense of efficiency. Here, we choose to relax seller incentive
ICALP 2016
142:8 Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising
compatibility and instead, enforce a fairness constraint among sellers while keeping buyer
incentive compatibility.
If we enforce [Eff] and [B-IC], the only mechanism available to decide on the allocation
and buyer payments is the VCG mechanism. VCG, however, treats all the sellers as one and
therefore doesn’t prescribe how the revenue of the auctions should be distributed among
the sellers. The central issue in the design of reservation exchange mechanisms is how to
distribute the revenue from the VCG auction in a manner that is fair to the sellers. As
we will see next, defining a precise notion of fairness that matches our intuition is a quite
non-trivial task. First, we show how the most natural definitions fail to capture important
situations.
3.4 Seller Fairness and Envy-Freeness
We start by identifying a set of properties that we believe a fair revenue sharing scheme
should satisfy. The challenge here is in identifying, when a buyer gets some item at price p,
if a seller can stake a claim on this revenue or not. Firstly, a seller si can claim revenue only
from buyers that are interested in the inventory owned by seller si, i.e., Ri[j] = 0 for j /∈ Bi.
Also, if a certain buyer bj never receives goods from seller si under any efficient allocation,
seller si shouldn’t be able to claim stake on the revenue of buyer bj . This is so because even
if this seller drops this connection to the buyer, it won’t change the set of efficient outcomes.
Moreover, the seller may end up getting a lower revenue because of the reduced competition
after dropping such a connection.
In order to capture the above notions, we define for each seller si, the set Ai ⊆ Bi as the
set of buyers that are allocated at least one good from si in some efficient allocation. We are
now able to define the concept of envy-free revenue sharing: roughly speaking, we say that a
revenue sharing scheme is envy-free if each seller si extracts from Ai more revenue then any
other seller with at most the same supply and proportionally more revenue than any seller
with higher supply. More specifically, this concept is defined as follows:
Envy-free Revenue Sharing [ERS]: ∀si, si′ ,
∑
j∈Ai Ri[j] ≥ min(1,
`si
`s
i′
) ·∑j∈Ai Ri′ [j].
If all sellers have the same supply, this boils down to
∑
j∈Ai Ri[j] ≥
∑
j∈Ai Ri′ [j]. We
note that if one is able to design an envy-free mechanism for sellers with unit-supply, this
automatically extends to sellers with non-unit supply by the following reduction: transform
each seller of supply `i in `i unit supply sellers. An envy free allocation in the transformed
setting naturally translates to an envy-free allocation in the original setting. For this reason
we will assume for the remainder of the paper that sellers are unit supply.
However, as shown in the following example, the above notion of envy-freeness doesn’t
fully capture the notion of a fair allocation among the sellers:
I Example 1. Consider two buyers with valuation v1 = 2, v2 = 1, and demands d1 = 2,
d2 = 1. There are two unit supply sellers s1, s2 with preference constraints shown in Figure 1.
For any mechanism satisfying [Eff], [B-IC] and [ERS], the allocation and payments charged
to the buyers must be the one of the VCG mechanism. So, the mechanism sells both items
to buyer b1 at total price 1.
Since A1 = A2 = {b1}, ERS imposes to share the revenue equally between s1 and s2.
This way to partition of the revenue can be hardly called fair, since the 1 dollar in revenue is
caused by the competition with buyer b2 that is brought to the market by seller s2. So a
natural intuition is that a ‘fair’ scheme should attribute the 1 dollar in revenue to seller 2.
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Figure 1 The two sellers receive different revenue.
The above example implies the need to refine the envy-freeness property to incorporate
some notion of which buyers are responsible for putting the price pressure. To get a handle
on such a notion, we consider ascending auctions to refine our envy-freeness property.
3.5 Fairness via ascending auction
The traditional definition of the VCG mechanism is that it allocates according to an efficient
allocation and charges each agent according to the externality it imposes on other agents.
One problem with this way of defining VCG is that it returns a bundle of items to each agent
and a total price but does not specify how much of the payment is attributed to each item.
An alternative way to define VCG is via an ascending auction [2, 1], in which there is a price
clock p that gradually ascends, and as the price increases items are allocated to buyers. The
total payment of the buyer in such a case is the sum over the prices of all individual items,
where the price of each item is the value of the price clock when the buyer acquired the item.
The ascending auction description of VCG returns for each buyer bj his allocation, say
xj ∈ Z+ together with xj prices p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pxj corresponding to the value of the price
clock when he acquires each of those items. In other words, we can describe the outcome of
VCG as an ascending auction as a set of n buying events, where n =
∑
i `i and each buying
event is a pair (bj , p) indicating that one item was sold to buyer bj at price p. Note that we
assume all items are sold by VCG, which is always the case when we consider proxy buyers
as discussed in Section 3.1.
Let E be the set of buying events that represents the outcome of the auction. During its
execution, the ascending auction maintains in each step a tentative assignment of buying
events to sellers. This allows us to define a bipartite graph between sellers and buying events
called the clinching graph. We say that a seller si is connected to buying event ej if this
seller is tentatively allocated to that buying event in some point of the auction execution. If
the auction execution is not unique (because of ties, caused for example by two identical
sellers) we consider an edge to be in the clinching graph if for some execution of the auction
its corresponding buying event is connected to the corresponding seller.
We refer to [1, 10, 13, 16] and to the full version of the paper for a formal definition of
the ascending auction, but we illustrate its execution for the instance in Example 1. The
price clock starts at zero, and at that price the auction is already able to allocate the item in
s1 to buyer b1, since he faces no competition on that item. This generates a buying event
(b1, 0) that is associated with seller s1. For prices between 0 and 1, both buyers compete
for the remaining item. When the price clock reaches 1, buyer b2 is no longer interested in
the remaining item and buyer b1 can acquire it at price 1, generating a buying event (b1, 1),
which is associated with seller s2. There are no ties, so this is the unique execution of the
auction, which generates the clinching graph represented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 Each seller is linked in the clinching graph to only one buying event.
Given the clinching graph, we are now able to define a stronger notion of envy-freeness
based on it. We denote by Ei the set of buying events associated to buyer bi and by ri[j]
the revenue obtained by seller si from buying event ej ∈ Ei. Let us denote the revenue of
unit supply seller si by ri =
∑
j∈Ei ri[j]. We now state a new version of Envy-free Revenue
Sharing, that we denote by ERSCG, as follows:
Envy-free Revenue Sharing from Clinching Graph [ERSCG]: ∀si, si′ ,
∑
j∈Ei ri[j] ≥∑
j∈Ei ri′ [j].
According to the definition of clinching graph, we obtain for the example of Figure 2
that E1 = {e1} and E2 = {e2}. The revenue sharing scheme that attributes r1[1] = 0,
r1[2] = 0, r2[1] = 0 and r2[2] = 1 is therefore ERSCG. We conclude that the new definition
of envy-freeness is able to characterize a fair sharing of the revenue between sellers.
We also define an approximate version of the previous property:
α-Envy-free Revenue Sharing from Clinching Graph[α-ERSCG]: ∀si, si′ ,
∑
j∈Ei ri[j] ≥
α
∑
j∈Ei ri′ [j].
We conclude by observing that the notion of envy-freeness we introduce can easily be
adapted to the original non-unit supply sellers.
4 Impossibility of Envy-freeness and Budget Balance
Before presenting two revenue sharing schemes based on the definition of clinching graph in
Sections 5 and 6, we show that envy-freeness and budget balance are indeed contradicting
objectives for any revenue sharing scheme based on an efficient allocation.
I Theorem 2. There does not exist any revenue sharing efficient mechanism for the reser-
vation exchange market which is BB and α-ERSCG for α ≥ √3 − 1 + δ ≈ 0.732, for an
arbitrary small value δ > 0.
5 Revenue sharing by the Clinching Ascending Auction.
The first revenue sharing scheme is based on the allocations computed by the clinching
ascending auction (CA). We denote by CA this revenue sharing scheme.
A detailed description of the use of the clinching ascending auction [2, 1] to compute
efficient VCG allocations is given in the full version of the paper. We specifically use a
version for matching markets given in [13].
Crucial to the definition of revenue sharing scheme is the notion of priority order among
sellers that is used in the execution of the CA. Whenever the CA is indifferent about buying
between a set of sellers, it decides in “favor” of the seller with lower priority in the precedence
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order. Intuitively, the seller of higher priority will enjoy a payment that is at least as good as
the lower priority seller since the price in the ascending auction is non-decreasing. A priority
order between sellers is simply represented by a permutation pi ∈ Π(S) where Π(S) defines
the set of all permutations of set S.
We set rpii [j] = pj if the execution of CA on permutation pi matches ej to si.
Revenue share of seller si from buying event ej is defined as
ri[j] = Epi∈Π(S)[rpii [j]]. (1)
The revenue of seller si is defined as ri =
∑
ej∈Ei ri[j]. Since the total revenue of the
mechanism REV =
∑
j∈E pj is shared between sellers, we state a first property of the revenue
sharing scheme CA:
I Claim 3. The revenue sharing scheme CA is BB.
We next prove that the revenue sharing scheme CA is not exact ERSCG.
I Theorem 4. The revenue sharing scheme CA is at most 1/2-ERSCG.
We next prove the approximate envy-freeness of revenue sharing scheme CA.
I Theorem 5. The revenue sharing scheme CA is 1/2-ERSCG.
We conclude with the properties of buyer monotonicity and seller monotonicity for revenue
sharing scheme CA.
I Theorem 6. BM and SM hold for revenue sharing scheme CA.
6 Revenue sharing by the Eating mechanism.
The eating mechanism is defined as a fractional process in time on the clinching graph
CG = (E ∪ S,H), H = {(ej , si) : ej ∈ Ei}. At each time x ∈ [0, 1], the unit supply seller si
“eats” from the the non-exhausted buying event ej ∈ Ei of highest payment pj . Each seller
will eat at most up to a fraction of 1. A buying event is exhausted when it has been eaten for
1 unit. The result of the eating mechanism is a fractional assignment xi[j] ∈ [0, 1] such that∑
j∈Ei xi[j] ≤ 1 for each seller si ∈ S and
∑
si:ej∈Ei xi[j] ≤ 1 for each buying event ej ∈ E.
Revenue share of seller si from buying event ej is defined as
ri[j] = xi[j]× pj . (2)
The total revenue of seller si is also equal to ri =
∑
j∈Ei ri[j].
It is easy to observe that the revenue shares by the eating mechanism can be computed
in polynomial time. We first show that revenue share mechanism EM is envy-free.
I Theorem 7. The revenue sharing scheme EM is ERSCG.
Proof. Consider any two sellers si and si′ . At any time x ∈ [0, 1] of execution of the eating
mechanism, seller si eats from the non-exhausted buying event ej ∈ Ei of highest payment pj .
At the same time x, si′ eats from a buying event ej′ . Buying event ej′ is either outside Ei or
it offers payment pj′ ≤ pj . When si stops eating, all ej ∈ Ei are exhausted. We conclude
that the revenue of si on Ei is higher than the revenue of si′ on Ei. J
It is not clear that in the EM sharing scheme all sellers eat up to 1. We show in the
following that EM is not exact budget balance.
I Theorem 8. For any  > 0, the revenue sharing scheme EM is at most 11+12+ -BB.
I Theorem 9. The revenue sharing scheme EM is 1− 1/e-BB.
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7 Conclusions
The reservation exchange market is an emerging model for internet advertising that brings
together multiple publishers and advertisers interested in trading inventories of impressions
available in the future. In this work, we present the axioms and the design principles at the
basis of mechanisms for reservation exchange markets. The goal we define for these markets
is the design of mechanisms that are incentive compatible for buyers, envy-free for sellers,
efficient and budget balance. We show that this is possible if one of the requirements of
budget balance or envy-freeness is slightly relaxed. Our efficient revenue sharing mechanisms
are based on the notion of clinching graph that is a convenient representation of the trades
of efficient VCG allocations.
We leave several open problems in the context of reservation exchange markets. First
of all, it would be interesting to close some of the gaps on approximate envy-freeness and
budget balance of the revenue sharing mechanisms we propose. It is also unknown whether
the eating mechanism holds some of the monotonicity properties we define in this paper.
Moreover, since the clinching graph seems to provide fundamental insights for designing fair
revenue sharing mechanisms, it would be helpful to derive its structure from basic properties
of VCG mechanisms.
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